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COMMENTS
subject even prior to the connection of the apparatus. The technique frequently
causes self-humiliation and loss of self-respect on the part of the individual
tested. It would seem that the legislature need only look to the manifest absence
of any proof of the polygraph's reliability and accuracy as an investigative
method to justify any condemnation of its use.8 9 Hence, the most equitable step
for the New York State Legislature at the present time would be enactment of a
statute prohibiting any use of the device by any employer, whether it be for
continued employment, initial employment,; a raise, promotion or a mere loyalty
check. Such legislation should, however, permit use of the polygraph by law en-
forcement agencies and sensitive positions involving national security. Industry,
having the resources available, should be called upon to prove the reliability and
accuracy of the polygraph before it can be allowed to subject millions of workers
to the machine's determination of "truth" or "falsity."
RONALD J. THOMAS
REFERRAL SALES CONTRACTS: TO ALTER OR ABOLISH?
PROLOGUE
The buyer originally admitted the television salesman to his home to
present his sales talk only as a favor to a friend. The friend had recently
purchased a set from the same company, under a contract calling for the
friend to set up appointments with other persons who might be interested.
For each appointment the friend made, he received a cash payment; if the
friend submitted enough names the entire cost of his color TV would be re-
imbursed by these "referral" payments. When the friend called to get per-
mission to refer the seller to our buyer, he had been quite enthusiastic.
By a stroke of good fortune, the salesman was authorized to offer the
same deal to the buyer and his wife. After hearing the carefully rehearsed
and artfully structured sales talk, the buyer became genuinely interested. They
did need a new TV, but really hadn't been able to buy one. A free TV-espe-
cially a color set-would be a different matter.
Of course near the end of his glittering sales talk the salesman did require
a few signatures on certain forms, but he had assured them that there was
89. As Representative Reuss stated during the congressional hearings, 1964 Hearings
at 332, "Nobody has ever made a study of the' actual lie detector cases to determine
whether, not in the laboratory or in the quasi-laboratory, but in the field of activity, they
are in fact worth anything or not." According to the 1965 House Report No. 198, supra
note 19, at 24, "the Federal Government has spent more then $300,000 for research projects
on various phases of the polygraph.... " Included in these were studies to determine the
value of the device:
in counterinsurgence situations (such as Vietnam), experiments to expand the basic
polygraph instrument by including additional sensors . . . and attempts to add a
computer to the polygraph for purposes of objective measurement. These . . . all
relate to expanding the use and the instrumentation of the polygraph device.
However, none of the research is the basic work necessary to prove scientifically
that the polygraph technique is an effective tool for interrogation purposes.
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nothing to worry about: the set would cost them nothing; his good friend had
signed, hadn't he? And the friend (who was one of the first to buy from the
company) was still happy after several months participation. So just sign
here, he said....
The buyer was quite impressed by the speed of the seller's delivery
service: within hours of the signing, the set was delivered.' This was certainly
an auspicious beginning.2 The buyer could not have known that the same
speed attended the transfer of his cntract to a financing agency.8
The reader is now asked to complete the above story, by choosing one
of the following: A. The seller went out of business a few months later, leaving
the buyer to pay off his debt to the financing agency 4 from his already strained
finances,5 without any of the promised "referral payments" to assist. B. The
seller kept stalling the buyer off, effectively preventing him from collecting
any of the payments already earned,6 with a result similar to the previous
alternative. C. The buyer soon found he could not take full advantage of
the referral provision because none of his friends were interested7 in dealing
with an unknown seller, or buying an unfamiliar brand. D. The buyer did
pay off his entire obligation with the "referral payments" without any prob-
lems or friction with the seller.8 (To aid the reader unfamiliar with this
scheme, the above answers have been listed in what seems to be, locally, the
descending order of probability.)
INTRODUCTION
Many articles and comments have been written about general problems in
instalment sales and about general theories behind retail instalment sales
1. See, e.g., Better Business Bureau of Western New York, Inc. Bulletin of March 12,
1965, p. 4. [hereinafter cited BBB Bulletin]
2. There was a more selfish purpose on the part of the seller: delivery of the pur-
chase, even without delivery of a fully executed copy of the contract, would probably
terminate the buyer's right to rescind the contract. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law, art. 10-Retail
Instalment Sales Act § 405 [hereinafter cited N.Y. Retail Instalment Sales Act].
3. With the consequence that the agency may now, subject to certain limits, cut off
or terminate defenses the buyer might have had or later acquired against the seller; see
infra, p. 676.
4. This term is used throughout to denote both banks and finance companies, a usage
sanctioned by N.Y. Retail Instalment Sales Act § 401(18).
5. This does not mean the buyer would be considered "poor," although the poor are
favorite targets of such schemes. The expression is used to indicate only that the buyer
is already committed to heavy instalment payments on other purchases. For a description
of the plight of the poor, see Caplovitz, The Poor Pay More (1963) ; Instalment Sales and
the Low-Income Buyer, 2 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 1 (Dec. 15, 1965).
6. See Norman v. World Wide Distrib., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963).
The same point was made in Lundstrom v. R.C.A., 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P.2d 339 (1965):
"[Buyers contend] that the defendant Utah Electronics arbitrarily disqualified prospective
purchasers [referred by the buyers] on whimsical and capricious grounds which is verified
by the fact that for only one purchaser, out of approximately 500, did Utah Electronics
accept 10 prospective purchasers and credit the $250." Id. at -, 405 P.2d at 340.
7. See Smith, The Bargain Hucksters 72 (1962).
8. The writer has been shown a referral contract asserting that some eleven million
dollars has been paid over to the seller's "satisfied customers"; there is no indication
whether any of these persons were able to pay off their obligations in full.
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legislation.9 Much less attention has been given to the specific ways these
laws are abused, evaded, avoided or broken with relative impunity.10 The
commercial and theoretical problems so often discussed should not be ignored,
but the consumer who is ensnared by the devices created for commercial
transactions should be given more attention.'1
This Comment deals with only one of the many consumer abuses12 the
referral sales contract. The imaginary description above is only the skeleton
of such a transaction, such details as prices, duration of the contract, actual
disclosures made to the buyer, and the many larcenous variations of the scene
described will appear in the following pages. For present purposes, an excellent
description of the subject of this Comment is: a plan "whereby the purchaser
is induced to buy a product upon the understanding that he will receive money
or credit on his purchase if he induces others to make similar purchases."'
3
For analytical purposes, the Comment is divided into five basic sections.
The problems of the overall plan'4 being somewhat different from the problems
of the indivdual buyer under the plan,15 these two areas will be separately dis-
cussed at the outset, along with some of the legal doctrines which work against
the defrauded buyer (I, II). Some of the infrequent and inadequate principles
invoked by courts to lessen the abuses will be set forth in the next section (III).
Legislative and executive measures to aid the buyer will comprise the next
section (IV). The Comment will conclude with proposals which should prove to
be effective remedies for the problems presented (V).
9. A comprehensive bibliography is published in 4 CCH Instalment Credit Guide
70,001. See, e.g., Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 44 Cornell
L.Q. 38 (1958); Rogers, State Instalment Sales Laws, 26 Time Sales Financing 9 (1962).
For an international comparison, see, e.g., Beyer, The Security Aspects of Conditional Sales
it Sweden with a Comparison of the Uniform Commercial Code, 4 B.C. Indus. & Comm.
L. Rev. 1 (1962); Donovan, Retail Instalment Sales--the Australian Experience, 33 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 666 (1958); Leys, Misrepresentation and the Sale of Goods" Proposed Amendments,
1964 N.Z.LJ. 323; Marschall von Biberstein, Legal Aspects of Instalment Selling and Instal-
ment Sales Financing in Germany, 19 Bus. Law. 409 (1964); Warren, Mexican Retail
Instalment Sales Law: a Comparative Study, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 15 (1962); Board of
Trade (Gr. Brit.), Final Report of Comm. on Consumer Protection, Cmnd. 1781 (1962).
10. See Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective
Programs for Protection, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 395, 424-27 (1966) ; see also infra, p. 683.
11. "It is the amateur, the consumer, who finds himself in a maze of codified rulings
which are integrated into a coherent rational whole, embodying an elegant and consistent
restatement of the recent history of commercial transactions. This most unfortunate con-
fusion of aesthetic values with the proper ends of the law bodes ill for the [consumer] ... "
Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts II, 35 Temp. L.Q. 281 (1962).
12. See, e.g., 1964 Report of New York State Dep't of Law 8; 1963 Report 12;
Consumer Services of New York, Part I: How Much Legal Protection Does New York
State Give the Consumer?, (pam. 1958).
13. 1965 New York Legislative Ann. 72, 1965 N.Y. Sess. Laws, p. 2087 (McKinney's)
(Memorandum of Dep't of Law); 1964 Report of New York State Dep't of Law 15.
14. In a sense the relation between the seller and all the buyers.
15. Generally, the relations of the buyer against the seller and the financing agency.
The two areas are obviously closely related, but the remedies appropriate to each are
significantly different.
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I. REFERRAL SALES PLANS
The referral sales plan is neither a novel nor a mysterious device in the
merchandising field. Like any other promotional scheme, it contains a certain
amount of promise of benefit to the buyers and becomes harsh and oppressive in
excessive use. The plan can be used in moderation, to the benefit of all con-
cerned, 16 or it can be misused, to' the ultimate detriment of all concerned.
Continual and exclusive use of such a plan by a seller makes it little different
from the plan's close relative, the chain-letterY' But where the number of
referrals any one buyer can make, or the number of buyers who can make
referrals, is limited, such a plan can benefit both buyers and the seller.18
Unfortunately referral sellers have shown little moderation in their use of
referral plans. With a potentially large margin of profit from buyers who cannot
or will not refer the seller to their friends, there is little motive for the seller
to change his methods. Without the referral feature, he would be just another
seller of his product or service, competing on equal terms with the others (or at
least such of them as did not exceed him in the use of "hard-sell" tactics).
The most common use of the referral device is by the dealer in a single
product or service who makes all of his sales under contracts requiring the
buyer to submit names or refer other customers. In most cases, the buyer is not
required to make referrals by an express term of the contract; the economic
pressure to reduce his obligation to manageable proportions, with the referral
payments, supplies the incentive. The effect of this unfailing use of the referral
feature will be traced shortly.
The referral sales plan, a device unusually subject to exploitation, has been
used by only a small part of the instalment sales field, the majority being
satisfied with their ordinary profits. However, despite the relatively small
number of sellers using it, the total economic impact of the plan has been quite
serious. 19 While no accurate figures are available to appraise the total losses or
16. At least in theory; because these cases do not come to the attention of the
authorities (law enforcement, such as the Attorney General or the District Attorney; or
quasi-public, such as the Chamber of Commerce or the Better Business Bureau), none have
been found. The activities of these authorities are discussed in depth in Comment, Trans-
lating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs jor Protection, 114 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 395 (1966).
17. See Lundstrom v. R.C.A., 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P.2d 339 (1965); Mackin and
Stickle, Beware the Referral Sales Racket, Parade, Sept. 6, 1964, p. 3; Gundrey, A Foot
in the Door 7-15, 199-201 (1965).
18. Few such plans have been found, perhaps because the referral payments made by
the seller under such a plan would represent an extra cost to the seller which he would
have to recoup from future non-referral sales. The future buyers would absorb little of
this extra cost without the referral feature to offset it. See note 166 infra and accompanying
text. As part of their sales talk, the referral sellers usually assert that they can offer the
"free" merchandise to the buyer because it is paid for by the savings the seller realizes on
advertising costs. This assertion is so far repudiated by the inflated prices these same sellers
charge that the writer deems it unworthy of notice.
,19. See BBB Bulletins of March 30, 1964, p. 4; March 12, 1969, p. 4; May 10, 1965,
p. 5; 1964 Report of New York State Dep't of Law 75; 1962 Report 11; 1959 Public Papers
of Gov. Nelson Rockefeller 30.
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diversion of income from other outlets, the cases of referral sales which have come
to the attention of the authorities involve millions of dollars.20 But even more
alarming is the fact that the amount paid or owed in these cases represents
many times the value of the merchandise received by the buyers under the
plans.2 1
Some of the reasons for the severe impact of these plans are: (i) as will
appear shortly, the price of the goods or service is inflated many times,
ostensibly to fund the referral commissions; 2 2 (ii) most of the sellers employ
high-pressure techniques to saturate the market rapidly; 23 (iii) the seller is
often very close to bankruptcy, raising the possibility of closing down the
business or moving to a new location; and (iv) the campaigns are often aimed at
buyers on a narrow margin of solvency.24 This last element appears incongruous,
but it is often of considerable importance to the success of the seller. These
buyers are the most apt to allow their need for the product (whether it be a
necessity or a "necessary luxury") to outweigh their caution.25 They are the
most likely to have had experience with a collection agency, the least likely to
employ legal counsel when trouble develops, and the least likely to be aware
of sources of assistance. 26
II. THE REFERRAL SALEs CONTRACT
A. The Buyer's Obligation
Looking at a single transaction in the overall plan, it is at once apparent
that the referral sales contract is essentially two agreements: an agreement
by the buyer to purchase consumer goods27 or services (usually at an inflated
20. See Matter of People v. Compact Associates, Inc., 22 A.D.2d 129, 254 N.Y.S.2d
265 (1st Dep't 1964) (at least 10,000 sales @ $300; there is no way to determine how much
was actually paid, what these amounts represented to the buyers in terms of other purchases
foregone, etc.). Cf. Bauer, Consumer Behavior As Risk Taking, American Mkt'g. Ass'n Conf.
Proceedings, June 1960, p. 389.
21. See infra., p. 675.
22. See note 28, infra, for specific examples; see also Matter of People v. Compact
Associates, Inc., 22 A.D.2d 129, 254 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1st Dep't 1964).
23. See Matter of People v. Compact Associates, Inc., supra, note 22.
24. See note 5, supra.
25. See State v. Lipkin, 169 N.C. 265, 84 S.E. 340 (1915): "It is the one playing at
the game [a lottery] who is influenced by the hope enticingly held out, which is often
false or disappointing, that he will, perhaps and by good luck, get something for nothing,
or a great deal for a very little outlay. This is the lure that draws the credulous and un-
suspecting into the deceptive scheme, and it is what the law denounces as wrong and
demoralizing." Id. at 271, 84 S.E. at 343. The "game" here involved was similar to a
referral in that the buyers were given a remission of the balance due on their purchases, if
the seller chose to use their names in advertising.
26. See Comment, Finance Companies and Banks as Holders in Due Course of Con-
sumer Installment Credit Paper, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 389 (1960); see also Budget Charge
Accounts, Inc. v. Mullaney, 187 Pa. Super. 190, 144 A.2d 438 (1958), and Excerpts From the
Evidence (in the Mullaney case) in 2 King, Uniform Commercial Code: Cases and Materials,
pp. 333-35; Caplovitz, op. cit. supra note 5; Sutherland, Article 3-Logic, Experience and
Negotiable Paper, 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 230; Note, 33 N.CJL. Rev. 608 (1955).
27. Consumer goods are defined in N.Y. Retail Instalment Sales Act § 401(1): "[A]II
chattels personal, . . . sold for other than a commercial or business use or for purpose of
resale." Cf. N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-109(1): Goods which "are used . . . primarily for personal,
family or household purposes. .. .
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price) 28 and to pay the seller for them; and an agreement by the seller to
compensate the buyer for each potential customer referred to the seller. 20 The
buyer's obligation is evidenced by one of three arrangements: (i) a contract
and a separately negotiable note; 30 (ii) a contract which includes the buyer's
entire obligation, but which does not include the seller's obligation; and (iii)
a single instrument which includes the entire agreement of both parties. The
seller makes the choice among the three schema not on the basis of economic
considerations but due to legal compulsion; 31 for example, where the law is silent
on the inclusion of the seller's agreement,32 this will usually be a simple contract,
separate from the contract signed by the buyer. Each succeeding arrangement
(in listed order) reduces the seller's opportunities to legally impose upon the
buyer; thus the seller will prefer them in the listed order.
Whichever of these arrangements is dictated by law, the referral contract,
like any other retail instalment contract, is a prepared form, placed in front of
the buyer for ratification or refusal.33 The buyer can reject the contract entirely,
if he can resist the salesman he faces,3 4 but he cannot vary the terms in any
28. See, e.g., BBB Bulletins of March 30, 1964 ($700 rug for which the buyer was to
pay $2100); October 29, 1964 (Olympic color TV for $1470); March 12, 1965 ($400 Dumont
color TV for $1437) ; 1964 Report of New York State Dep't of Law 76 ($10/yard carpeting
for $25-35/yard); see also Matthews v. Aluminum Acceptance Corp., 1 Mich. App. 570,
137 N.W.2d 280 (1965) (cash price of aluminum siding quoted to buyer as $3250; note
executed for $5127); Matter of People v. Compact Associates, Inc., 22 A.D.2d 129, 254
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1st Dep't 1964) ($90 Compact vacuum cleaner for $300); Norman v. World
Wide Distrib., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963) ($200 breakfront for $1079);
Lundstrom v. R.C.A., 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P.2d 339 (1965) ($695 color TV for $1000).
At the present moment the Compact vacuum cleaners referred to above are being sold
locally under referral contracts calling for payments of $240, less payments earned.
29. N.Y. Retail Instalment Sales Act § 402(2) continues: "or for referring the seller
to such customers or prospective customers." The difference between the two situations is
that the former contemplates the potential customer's taking the initiative, and the latter
(quoted above) that the seller will do so.
30. N.Y. Retail Instalment Sales Act § 403(1),(2) permits the execution of a sepa-
rately negotiable promissory note only in connection with home repairs and improvements.
Such items as siding, roofing, water softeners, etc. are often sold under referral contracts.
See Smith, The Bargain Hucksters 73-78 (1962); Matthews v. Aluminum Accept-
ance Corp., 1 Mich. App. 570, 137 N.W.2d 280 (1965) (aluminum siding); Ohio Att'y Gen.,
Consumer Frauds and Crime Bulletin No. 5-123-64 (May 1964). Why home repair con-
tracts should be excepted from the prohibition against promissory notes is unexplained:
if the argument is advanced that larger sums of money are required or involved than in
most purchases, the reply might well be that this is all the more reason to protect the
buyer against being trapped by the mask of negotiability.
31. Cf. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 255, § 12C (Supp. 1964) requiring that all promissory
notes executed as part of a sale of consumer goods bear the legend "consumer note" and
making such notes non-negotiable. Seller's failure to include such legend on note procured
from buyer bears a fine of $100-500. See also Vernon, Priorities, The Uniform Commercial
Code and Consumer Financing, 4 B.C. Indus. & Comm. L. Rev. 543 (1962-63); Recent
Legislation, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (1961).
32. See infra, p. 680. Only two such requirements are indexed in CCH Instalment
Credit Guide: Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1803.2 [applies to consumer goods generally] (vol. 1, op.
cit. at 10,115), 2982 [Auto Sales Finance Act] (id. at 10,063-5); N.Y. Retail Instalment
Sales Act § 402(2) (vol. 2, op. cit. at 38,014).
33. Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 Temp. L.Q. 125, 128
(1962); Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50 Va. L.
Rev. 230, 236. See also Gundrey, A Foot in the Door (1965).
34. See Matter of People v. Compact Associates, Inc., 22 A.D.2d 129, 254 N.Y.S.2d
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particular.35 The use of such form contracts is an advantage to the seller-they
offer uniformity, speed, low cost, etc. But none of these benefits accrue to the
buyer.3
6
The terms of the contract placed before the referral buyer for his signature
follow a single pattern, regardless of the type of product or the identity of the
seller. A typical37 example of such a contract (based on an actual case history)
is as follows: a buyer agrees to pay 1437 dollars in 36 monthly instalments for
a color television set available elsewhere at a cash price of around 400 dollars.
During each of the succeeding 36 months, the buyer may, by providing the seller
with the name of a potential customer, earn a payment of $39.96 to cover his
payment.38 If all goes well, the buyer can pay off his entire debt with the referral
commissions; 39 the seller has 36 new leads, pre-selected 40 and frequently favor-
ably pre-conditioned 4' by the original buyer. But seldom does all go well ...
Because the seller must depend on the failure of at least some buyers to take
full advantage of the referral payments to make a profit, or even to secure a
265 (1st Dep't 1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Pa. Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers Research
Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428 (1964). This salesman represents a sub-group
of "high-pressure business fired with the forced draft of advertisements promising that youth,
abiding romance, distinction, contentment, the envy of neighbors, and the proud affection
of children are to be had by merely signing some papers and making the nominal down-
payment." Sutherland, Article 3-Logic, Experience and Negotiable Paper, 1952 Wis. L.
Rev. 230, 236. See also Gundrey, A Foot in the Door (1965).
35. Shuchman, op. cit. supra note 33 at 127-28.
36. See Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700 (1939).
37. There are variations in detail among the plans; these are referred to in later
portions of the text. For example, some contracts require a sale for earning the payments;
some have a graduated scale of payments for (a) sending letters to potential customers,
(b) referrals resulting in demonstrations, and (c) referrals resulting in sales. See Ohio
Att'y Gen., Consumer Frauds and Crimes Bulletin No. 8-102-63 (Aug. 1963).
38. BBB Bulletin, March 12, 1965, p. 4. The writer learned from a buyer under
this plan that the buyer had to arrange an interview with the prospect; however some
plans require only the name of the prospect.
39. Some of the more abusive referral schemes are almost indistinguishable from the
chain letter in that the buyer receives not only "free" merchandise, but is told he will reap
riches from commissions on all sales to persons he refers, smaller commissions on sales to
persons his customers refer, etc. See First Discount Corp. v. Cua, 117 Ohio App. 105, 190
N.E.2d 695 (Ct. App. Monroe County 1962) (a variation of this continuous commission
plan); Norman v. World Wide Distrib., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 55, 195 A.2d 115, 116
(1963); Mackin and Stickle, Beware the Referral Sales Racket, Parade, Sept. 6, 1964, p. 3.
Such plans are not separately dealt with herein; they are only more outrageous cases of
the abuses with which this article is concerned.
40. The buyer "pre-selects" the customers since he can only choose persons whom he
knows well enough to approach for permission to send a salesman to call.
41. The buyer is often required to send form letters, make telephone calls, or make
personal recommendations to the prospective customers; the representations in these contacts
must be laudatory or else the buyer is defeating his own purpose (and admitting to the
prospect that the buyer fell for a bad deal) ; see Norman v. World Wide Distrib., Inc., 202
Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963); Commonwealth ex rel. Pa. Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers
Research Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428 (1964) (where the buyer was "re-
tained by ... the seller ... , for a term of three years to make personal contacts, write
letters and otherwise refer prospective customers to seller." Id. at 254, 199 A.2d at 429).
The writer has been shown a form letter inviting the prospective customer to participate
in "an exciting new contest"--in fact a referral contract to purchase a $90 vacuum cleaner
for $2401 For each such letter sent, the buyer was to receive 300 trading stamps.
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current income from his sales,42 he must either have considerable financial capital
or be able to turn the buyers' contracts into cash. That is, he cannot pay out
referral commissions every month to every buyer and keep paying his suppliers
and salesmen, unless he has access to large capital resources. The case of the
self-financed seller is rare; usually the seller must turn to a financing agency for
operating funds.43 Even where it is not strictly necessary, because the buyers are
not able to take full advantage of the referral feature,44 the seller will usually
choose to transfer the buyers' obligations, because this reduces the risk of
buyers' asserting defenses against payment of their debts.
The financing agency will purchase the buyers' obligations, either notes or
contracts, at a price which provides it a profit. But the agency will also demand
certainty that the buyer will, or can be made to, pay the entire amount of the
debt, without regard to seller's performance. This can only be guaranteed in the
case of a contract if the buyer waives, 43 before the transfer, the defenses he could
42. To illustrate the seller's predicament, using the figures supra, p. 675. Assuming
the buyer's obligation to be $1437, the seller can sell the contract to a financing agency
for around $1000. This means that just to make up the difference between what he receives
and what he will owe the successful buyer (ignoring for the moment the seller's overhead
costs, and the time over which the buyer earns his payments) the seller must have another
A37 contracts to add to the above $1000, in order to pay the original buyer. To carry this
out to round figures, the seller must secure roughly three new contracts to pay for two
old contracts. Given the fragile financial position of most referral sellers, this progression
means the seller must require a sale as a condition of the buyer's receiving a payment; the
sellers who pay for appointments without a sale may find themselves trapped by the same
chain letter feature which defeats the buyers.
43. The seller usually realizes somewhat less than the face value of consumer contracts
and notes, the precise percentage depending on the solvency of the buyer, etc. See Missouri
Dep't Stores v. Personal Fin. Co., 364 S.W.2d 47 (K.C. Mo. Ct. App. 1962). See also Fand,
Competition and Regdation in the Consumer Credit Market, 20 Personal Fin. L.Q. Rpt.
18 (1965).
44. Where the buyers are unable to earn all the possible referral payments the seller
will of course be paying out less than he receives.
45. Such waivers are generally permitted by statute, but are severely restricted. The
New York Retail Instalment Sales Act § 403(3) (a) permits the waiver of defenses against
the seller's assignee, but sets out in considerable detail the notice to the buyer required to
effectuate the waiver clause. This notice must include a legend in eight point bold type that
unless the assignee-holder is notified of the defenses within ten days, such defenses will
become ineffective.
The courts have tended to disfavor such waivers, in part because they so frequently
result in oppression of the buyer, and are so seldom the result of bargaining of the parties.
Waivers were, however, upheld in, e.g., Straight v. James Talcott, Inc., 329 F.2d 1 (10th
Cir. 1964); First Nat'l Bank of Elgin v. Husted, 57 Ill. App. 2d 227, 205 N.E.2d 780 (1965);
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Biagi, 11 Ill. App. Zd 80, 136 N.E.2d 580 (1956); Walter J.
Hieb Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 332 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1959)
(as modified on rehearing); Bebee v. Bank of New York, 1 Johns. R. 529, 3 Am. Dec. 353
(N.Y. 1808); B.W. Acceptance Corp. v. Richmond, 46 Misc. 2d 447, 259 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup.
Ct. 1965). See also Recent Developments, Instalment Sales: Waiver of Defenses as to
Assignees, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 733 (1965).
Cases in which the waiver was held ineffective include: Quality Finance Co. v. Hurley,
337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958) (omnibus waiver clause not sufficient to inform
buyer of import thereof); Danann Realty Co. v. Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317, 157 N.E.2d 597,
184 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1959) (dictum to same effect); Wilcox v. Howell, 44 N.Y. 398 (1871);
DeBell v. Nothnagle Florida Realty Corp., 24 A.D.2d 825, 264 N.Y.S.2d 190 (4th Dep't
1965) (mem) (buyer could show fraud in the inducement notwithstanding waiver) ; President
& Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Monogram Associates, Inc., 276 App. Div. 766, 92 N.Y.S.2d
579 (2d Dep't 1949) (mem) (dictum that buyers could show fraud in inducement);
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have asserted against the seller in a suit on the obligation. Therefore, the buyer's
instalment sales contract will contain a clause whereby the buyer acknowledges
that the contract may be assigned and waives such defenses against the assignee.
The buyer's contract, shorn of much of the buyer's protection against
possible exploitation, is thus made acceptable to and transferred to a financing
agency. Before the financing agency entered the relationship, the buyer had at
least some protection against the graver abuses the seller might inflict. For
example, if the seller failed to fully perform his part of the contract, either as
to quantity46 or quality,47 the buyer could have withheld payment or rescinded
the contract; the seller could not have recovered the full price until and unless
he fully performed. But once the contract has been assigned, the protection
disappears.48
After the assignment, the buyer must make his monthly payments to the
agency, assuming he is duly notified by the agency of the transfer.49 The terms
of the contract remain the same: the amount of the buyer's obligation, the size
of the payments, the date of the payments, etc. are not affected by the transfer.
Were it not that the buyer has "agreed" to surrender his defenses against the
seller, 0 the transfer would impose no additional burden on him.
Turning to the second pattern of buyer's obligations mentioned above-the
contract accompanied by a separately negotiable note51-the result is similar,
although the theory is somewhat different. The buyer does not waive his defenses
by a provision in the contract but by executing the negotiable note itself. 52 When
Mohawk Nat'l Bank v. Chalifaux, 33 Misc. 2d 987, 227 N.Y.S.2d 526 (Schenectady County
Ct. 1962) (fraud in inducement).
46. This situation frequently arises when the purchase is delivered in instalments(such as magazines), or when it consists of services to be performed over a period of
time. The term also denotes the non-performance of any collateral obligation owed by the
seller.
47. E.g., the merchandise delivered to the buyer was defective, inoperable, or failed
to meet the contract specifications.
48. See Are Changes Coming in Those One-Sided Credit Laws?, 31 Consumer Reports
108 (1966): "[The threat to withhold payment] . .. is no threat at all to an unscrupulous
seller who already has converted credit obligations into cash by selling them. Nor is it
likely to be effective against the finance company. In legal parlance, this lender may be an
innocent 'holder in due course' and, under the laws of a majority of states, a buyer cannot
bring against a holder-in-due-course [sic] many of the claims he might have brought
against the seller." See also 4 Am. Jur. Assignments §§ 95-97 (1937), 41 N.Y. Jur. Negotiable
Instruments § 56 (1965).
49. N.Y. Retail Instalment Sales Act § 403(3) (a). The buyer must notify the agency
within ten days of receipt of this notice of any claims or defenses he has against the seller
or they are no longer available against the agency. See 41 N.Y. Jur. Negotiable Instruments
§ 56 (1965); Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 44 Cornell
L.Q. 38, 65-66 (1958). This notice must' comply with the statutory requirements or the
assignee will take nothing under the contract; see Zenith Financial Corp. v. Jolly Gene
Distrib., Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 821, 249 N.Y.S.2d 30 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Joseph B. Cooper &
Son, Inc. v. Finlay Dep'ts, Inc., 11 Misc. 2d 382, 174 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 1958). "
50. See also 2 Coogan, Hogan & Vagts, Secured Transactions Under U.C.C. § 20.06[2]
(1964).
51. The note to be negotiable must be: (a) signed by the maker (i.e., the buyer),(b) containing an unconditional promise (c) to pay a sum certain (d) to order or to
bearer (e) on demand or at a certain future date. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-104 et seq.
52. For a discussion of a similar problem in the commercial world, cf. Kripke, Practice
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this note is subsequently endorsed to the agency, the buyer's defenses are cut off
or terminated, if the agency has become a "holder in due course." 5
3
Thus the buyer will usually be deprived of defenses against the enforce-
ment of his debt obligation no matter what form that obligation takes, by a
waiver in .the contract, or by the endorsement of the note. The defenses most
common in the retail instalment sales area, such as those mentioned above
5 4
are usually discovered only after a period of time; if this comes too late to
notify the agency in due time,55 the buyer is helpless against the agency.
The potential abuse is obvious. The buyer is bound by an almost certainly
enforcible contract. If the seller cannot be found or cannot be compelled to make
the referral payments, the buyer ends up paying an unreasonable price for his
purchase.
This problem-the buyer who can neither enforce his rights against the
seller nor assert defenses based thereon against the holder of his obligation-is a
central 'theme in much of the consumer fraud area.5 6 And in the case of the
referral buyer any of the common abuses giving rise to claims or defenses
against the seller may be and often is added to the special problems such a
buyer faces. The merchandise is just as likely to be defective as it is in any
instalment sale; 57 since the referral buyer has paid an inflated price his loss
Commentary to U.C.C. § 9-206(1), in 622 McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York
Ann., at 416 (1964).
53. The status of holder in due course is accorded one who takes a negotiable instru-
ment "(a) for value; and (b) in good faith; and (c) without notice that it is overdue or
has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person,"
N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-302. The N.Y. Retail Instalment Sales Act defines a "holder" as "the
retail seller who acquires a retail instalment contract, obligation or credit agreement
executed, incurred or entered into by a retail buyer, or if the contract, obligation or credit
agreement is purchased by a financing agency or other assignee, the financing agency or
other assignee." § 401(15).
The practical consequences of this doctrine are suggested by the article Are Changes
Coming in Those One-Sided Credit Laws?, 31 Consumers Report 108 (1966): "Really good
credit laws are as yet nonexistent, and even fairly good ones are very scarce. Because
lenders may go along quite far with an instalment purchaser before invoking their powers,
most people are not aware of how thoroughly they put themselves in the lender's hands
with that name on the dotted line." Id. at 1,10.
54. See notes 46-47 supra; see also Instalment Sales and the Low-Income Buyer, 2
Colum. JJL. & Soc. Prob. 1 (Dec. 15, 1965).
55. The buyer must notify the agency within ten days of the notice of the transfer of
a contract, or before the endorsement to the agency of a note; see notes 49, 53, supra.
56. See Comment, Finance Companies and Banks as Holders in Due Course of Con-
sumer Installment Credit Paper, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 389 (1960):
The instalment buyer is often a person of limited resources and finds himself unable
to pursue costly litigation against the seller, and situations in which the seller
has absconded or is bankrupt leave the buyer no possibility of recourse against the
seller. Courts are thus faced with the problem of deciding whether the policy
behind ... [negotiability] requires the buyer to bear these risks and expenses,
or whether they ought to fall upon the finance company or bank, particularly when
the evidence shows the latter to have been in intimate association with the retail
seller in his consumer instalment credit transactions.
Id. at 389. See also Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective
Programs for Protection, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 395 (1966).
57. See Comment, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 395 (1966) (full cite in note 56 supra); see also
Caplovitz, The Poor Pay More (1963).
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is proportionately greater if he is compelled to pay his debt in full to a financer,
while getting less than he bargained for in return.
58
This doctrine of negotiability (or assignability) is perhaps the best example
in the retail sales field of a legitimate doctrine applied to circumstances where
it is ill-suited. In the commercial world the doctrine is necessary, useful and of
great benefit to both sellers and buyers.5 9 But in the retail sales area, it can be
argued that the consequences of permitting the agency to collect from the
buyer without regard to the adequacy of the performance the buyer receives
are undesirable. The doctrine provides no flexibility between the buyer and the
agency; 60 the agency either collects the entire debt or nothing.
A more basic objection to the negotiable instrument concept in retail in-
stalment sales is that it assumes consumer paper undergoes the same repeated
transfer that is typical of commercial paper. This is rarely if ever the case: the
first transfer of consumer paper' is generally the last.62 To invoke a principle
developed to make repeated exchanges possible in a situation where such is not
the case is to prefer symmetry to truth.
63
Another reason to modify the working of the negotiability concept in the
consumer world is that it operates exclusively to the benefit of the seller and the
financing agency. The buyer can defend himself against the agency invoking
the doctrine of negotiability only by a prolonged contest, 4 usually by litigation.
There is no way he can employ the doctrine to protect his interests.6 5
Some states66 have indicated that negotiable consumer obligations are not
indispensable to the carrying on of instalment business. They ended the use of
58. If, for example, the buyer who pays around $600 for the $400 TV on an ordinary
instalment contract and the referral buyer who pays $1450 are both delivered a defective
set worth $300, the former has paid twice its value, the latter nearly five times.
59. See 7 Am. Jur. Bills and Notes § 15 (1937): "Commercial paper, in its inception,
was a device adopted by merchants and bankers for the ready transfer of credits between
distant points." The present volume of interstate and international trade certainly requires
the continued use of such instruments by and among merchants; but the consumer rarely
engages in such trade.
60. Either the agency meets the requirements of a holder in due course or an innocent
assignee for value or it does not; there is little to prompt the agency to compromise in any
but very doubtful cases. See cases cited infra, note 109. The status of the assignee for value
is discussed in 7 Am. Jur. Bills & Notes §§ 18-19 (Supp. 1963).
61. Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts II, 35 Temp. L.Q. 281, 287
(1962); see also Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach,
50 Va. L. Rev. 1178 (1964),
62. Ibid. See also Jones, Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer
Paper, 1958 Wash. U.L.Q. 177, 179.
63. Shuchman, op. cit. supra note 61, at 281-82. See also King, The Unprotected
Consumer-Maker Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 Dick. L. Rev. 207 (1961).
64. See Comment, Finance Companies and Banks as Holders in Due Course of Con-
sumer Installment Credit Paper, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 389 (1960); Note, Finance Company as
a Holder in Due Course, 51 Ky. L.J. 134 (1962).
65. The buyer would be the last to argue that the financing company was a holder
in due course; if he has no complaints the issue never arises; if he does have defenses an
agency enjoying this status would defeat his attempt to resist payment. The doctrine is
aimed at freeing the instrument of defenses, not at aiding the buyer.
66. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 255, § 12C (Supp. 1964); Md. Ann. Code art. 83,
§ 147 (1957); see also Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 427 (1961).
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such instruments by statute; 67 the use of assignable contracts with waiver of
defense clauses has not been restricted. The argument of the financial world that
consumer instalment sales would be restrained or reduced by the abolition of
negotiable instruments has not been borne out by the evidence from these
states.68
B. The Seller's Obligation
The document evidencing the seller's obligation, if separate from the buyer's,
is retained by the seller. The two parts of the referral sales contract, in states
having no requirement that they be in one instrument,6 9 may thus operate
totally independent of each other, since there is nothing on the face of the
buyer's contract to qualify the obligation it recites. The buyer may readily be
compelled to pay the entire purchase price to the agency even though he receives
no referral payments from the seller."
0
New York has recently attacked this particular problem by requiring that
the obligations of both buyer and seller be contained in one instrument.71 In
practice this requirement may provide less protection than intended72-the
problem of the vanishing seller is not reached by such a limited approach.
1 3
This is so because under the terms of the New York Retail Instalment Sales
Act section 402(2), as amended, the financing agency can no longer assert that
it had no notice of the conditional nature of the buyer's obligation. 4 The
contract must contain a notice7 5 that the balance due from the buyer may at
any time be reduced by the amount of the commissions earned. But in many
cases this is precisely the problem-the buyer never gets the opportunity to
67. Massachusetts placed the new amendment in its penal code; the provisions are
summarized in note 31, supra. And generally where the consumer has been so protected,
the flow of commerce has been uninterrupted; see Sutherland, Article 3-Logic, Experience
and Negotiable Paper, 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 230.
68. Sutherland, op. cit. supra note 67; see also Comment, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 395 (1966).
69. The absence of such a requirement is the general rule; see note 32, supra. Utah
Code Ann. § 15-1-2a (1953) is similar insofar as it requires that the entire agreement of the
buyer and seller be contained in a single instrument. The effectiveness of the provision for
protecting referral buyers was probably destroyed by Lundstrom v. R.C.A., 17 Utah 2d
114, 405 P.2d 339 (1965), by a dictum to the effect that this did not prohibit a separate
referral contract.
70. See Norman v. World Wide Distrib., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1965);
BBB Bulletin, March 12, 1965, p. 4.
71. N.Y. Retail Instalment Sales Act § 402(2) was amended to require this by 1965
N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 872, effective September 1, 1965.
72. Since the agency takes subject to notice that the buyer may earn payments from
the seller, but is not in any way bound to pay them on seller's default, the same "whip-
sawing" may result -as did prior to the amendment; that is, the agency may still accept the
obligation without fear of being exposed to a defense founded on fact that the seller
has ceased to do business.
73. See note 26, suepra. Quaere whether this modifies to some extent the requirement
that the buyer notify the seller's assignee of claims and defenses: the assignee here already
knows of the potential claim of the buyer.
74. N.Y. Retail Instalment Sales Act § 402(2) (Supp. 1965).
75. Notice may still be gained by other means, such as knowledge of facts and circum-
stances surrounding the sale; see N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-305(2)(c); cf. Uniform Negotiable
Instrument Law § 55.
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earn the commissions, because the seller is no longer around, or no longer in
a position to accept referrals, or has gone bankrupt,7 6 or if he is still available,
he disqualifies potential customers. 77
And the failure of the seller is a very real danger,7 8 even assuming utmost
good faith intentions on his part. The sellers using such plans as the continuous
referral plan described above are almost always inadequately financed and
seldom survive for long. The seller may find less money coming in than he
needs to pay his expenses and the buyers' commissions.79 This shortage of
operating funds could amount to an enormous sum in a relatively short time
under some plans, given the scale of their operations.8
0
When the seller can no longer supply the extra funds needed to finance the
plan, and doses his doors, the buyers who have earned few or no payments are
without a remedy: the seller cannot and will not of course accept more refer-
rals8l and the finance company or bank has no use for them. Using the figures
indicated earlier82 to show the chance the buyer takes, it will be seen that the
seller must stay in business at least 21 months after a given buyer signs his con-
tract to enable that buyer to reduce his obligation to 600 dollars. Assuming this
to approximate the ordinary time price83 (instalment price) of the purchase, it
takes almost two years for the buyer to bring his debt down to a competitive or
76. A specific treatment of the' bankrupt referral seller is far beyond the scope of
this work. It should be pointed out however that the seller may not be able to escape the
defrauded buyers by a discharge in bankruptcy; money or property obtained by fraud or
false pretenses remains subject to the claims of creditors; 11 U.S.C.A. ch. 3, § 35. The
buyers could certainly argue that the seller had obtained their money by fraud, if the
seller represented the inflated price to be the actual value of the item purchased; see Griffin
v. Bergeda, 152 Tenn. 512, 279 S.W. 385 (1926) ; 1 Collier, Bankruptcy § 17 (14th ed. 1961).
77. See BBB Bulletins, March 12, 1965, pp. 3, 4; May 10, 1965, p. 5; see also note 6,
supra; Comment, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 389 (1960).
78. Ibid.
79. See note 42, supra.
80. See Matter of People v. Compact Associates, Inc., 22 A.D.2d 129, 254 N.Y.S.2d
265 (1st Dep't 1964) (where about 10,000 sales were made at $300 apiece; if the seller
had to finance any significant part of this, the capital required would certainly be
extensive).
81. The seller can no longer make use of referrals, since he no longer has a sales
organization; also, by hypothesis, he cannot afford to pay for them-this is what caused
him to go out of business.
82. See text accompanying note 38, supra.
83. The time price doctrine is another legal anomaly. This doctrine permits the seller
to charge any time price he chooses for his product, on the theory that the charge isjustified by his giving the buyer the privilege of paying over a period of time. The dif-
ference between the ordinary cash price and the inflated "instalment" price is not subject
to the usury laws, because it does not represent the loan of money (held to be rather a loan
of goods) ; it is therefore not interest. The credit service charge (regulated as a percentage of
the time price) is frequently deemed to be interest, but the bulk of the debt is not. See
Comment, Should the Usury Laws Be Used to Solve the Instalment Sales "Problem"?, 4
B.C. Ind. & Comm. L. Rev. 389, 390 (1963); Comment, Limiting Consumer Credit Charges
by Reinterpretation of General Usury Laws and by Separate Regulation, 55 Nw. UL. Rev.
303 (1960); Fisher, Constitutionality of a Consumer Code To Be Argued at Annual Meeting,
19 Pers. Fin. Law Q. Rpt. 84, 85 (1965); Warren, Mexican Retail Instalment Sales Law: A
Comparative Study, 10 U.C.L.AL. Rev. 15 (1962). But see, e.g., Shuck v. Murdock Accep-
tance Corp., 220 Ark. 56, 247 S.W.2d 1 (1951) (usury law violated where additions to cash
sale price exceed maximum lawful rate of interest).
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((market" level; that is, to recoup the premium charged for participation in the
referral plan.
Until this point in the discussion it has been assumed that the seller, though
in shaky financial condition, has operated within the law. He has used every
"hard sell" technique,84 and has been casual about the buyer's reading the
contracts--but the law has been complied with in every particular. As noted the
plight of the referral buyer is bad enough in these circumstances; consider his
problem when faced by a seller who chooses to ignore the law.80
If the seller makes an oral promise to pay referral commissions, but fails
to include the referral agreement in the contract, the buyer may be precluded
from proving its existence. The agreement is almost certain to include an
"integration" clause,8 7 providing that the writing includes the entire agree-
ment of the parties, and that no other agreements or representations are binding
upon the seller.88 The buyer's assent to this clause being indicated by his
signature,8 9 he may be barred from proving the excluded referral agreement
by the parol evidence rule °0 Most courts would find other grounds for relieving
the buyer in such a case, 91 but this hardly makes the amended statute any more
effective.92
84. See Matter of People v. Compact Associates, Inc., 22 A.D.2d 129, 254 N.Y.S.2d
265 (1st Dep't 1964).
85. The seller can afford to be casual, because the contract is made up in large part
of innocuous appearing but devastatingly effective language; cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). And very few buyers will insist on reading
the contract, especially when the salesman makes it difficult; First Nat'l Bank of Philadelphia
v. Anderson, 5 Bucks 287, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 661 (1956). An excellent discussion of the prob-
lem appears in Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts II, 35 Temp. L.Q.
281, 309 (1962); see also note 90, infra; King, The Unprotected Consumer-Maker Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 65 Dick. L. Rev. 207, 209-11 (1961); Leys, Misrepresentation
and the Sale of Goods: Proposed Amendments, 1964 N.Z.L.J. 323.
86. See 1963 Report of New York State Dep't. of Law 12: "Our experience has
shown that the overwhelming majority of business people carry on with integrity and due
regard for those with whom they deal. However, a fringe element using every means of
trickery and deceit continues to drain millions of dollars each year from the consuming
public." (Ass't Att'y Gen. Levy, Dep't. of Consumer Frauds and Protection).
87. Cf. Wittenberg v. Robinov, 9 N.Y.2d 261, 173 N.E.2d 868,'213 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1961).
88. See note 90, infra.
89. The buyer's signature is presumptive evidence of acceptance of the terms thereof;
in addition, most contracts will contain a conspicuous legend immediately above the space
for the buyer's signature that he has read and accepted the terms of the contract. See, e.g.,
First Nat'l Bank of Elgin v. Husted, 57 Ill. App. 2d 227, 205 N.E.2d 780 (1965) (signature
on front bound buyer to waiver of defense terms on back of contract); B.W. Acceptance
Corp. v. Richmond, 46 Misc. 2d 447, 259 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (bound by signature
to assent to assignment); see also 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 150 (1960); 1954 N.Y. Law
Revision Comm'n Report, [vol. 2], at 1046-51 (Legal Aid Society memo regarding pro-
posed U.C.C. § 9-206(1)).
90. This rule forbids the use of oral testimony to vary or contradict the terms of a
written contract intended by the parties to represent their entire agreement. Since the
contracts under discussion specify this intent, the buyer cannot offer oral proof that the
seller (or his agent) agreed to any obligation not shown in the contract. The buyer may
of course show fraud by the seller regardless of the contents of the writing. See note 46,
supra.
91. See infra, notes 109-22 and accompanying text. See also Nassau Discount Corp. v.
Allen, 44 Misc. 2d 1007, 255 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1965); Note, 63 Colum. L.
Rev. 733 (1965).
92. Cf. Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of 1960, 38 Texas L. Rev. 439 (1960).
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The seller who fails to include the referral provision in the contract would
seem to be subject to criminal action under the terms of the Retail Instalment
Sales Act in New York.9 3 Section 414(1) provides that any seller who wilfully
fails to comply with the provisions of any section of the Act is guilty of a:
misdemeanor. But the force of this sanction is removed by section 414(3) of
the Act,94 " if the seller 95 corrects the non-compliance within ten days after
written notice from the buyer. Thus the seller who chooses to ignore the new
requirement apparently can do so with impunity until and unless he is caught
by a buyer who knows his rights or is willing and able to pay counsel fees to
secure them.90 The question of compliance would rarely arise until some sort
of litigation was started; then it would probably be too late for the buyer,
especially if suit was brought by the financing agency to collect on the buyer's
contract.
97
There is similarly no guarantee that the new inclusion requirement, even if
followed, will provide the buyer with better knowledge of his rights under the
contract,08 despite that now he is assured a copy of the seller's obligation.99
The terms, as orally presented (i.e., the terms used as an inducement to the
buyer), are often misrepresentations or misinterpretations of the written terms.
There will be enough resemblance between the oral presentation and the written
language to allay suspicion; even the cautious buyer who reads the contract 0 0
93. The penalties for violation prescribed by § 414(1) (2) include a fine up to $500,
and recovery by the buyer of an amount equal to the credit service (interest) charge plus
any delinquency, collection, extension, etc. charges if the latter are imposed.
94. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1812.8, which prohibits the correction of any wilful violation,
and any correction which would increase the buyer's total obligation or a payment, unless
the buyer specially concurs. This would be a much more meaningful protection against the
wilful violator than is the present § 414.
95. The term "holder" in the first portion of the statute would seem to mean seller,
notwithstanding the use of "holder or seller" in the last clause of the sentence. Cf. § 401(18).
96. Violation usually proves more profitable than compliance, because of the relatively
light penalties, the unwilling witnesses, and the greater value of the contracts without the
statutory safeguards. See, e.g., Comment, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 395, 427 (1966); Are Changes
Coming in Those One-Sided Credit Laws?, 31 Consumer Reports, 108, 111-12 (1966); see
also Ben Constr. Corp. v. Snushall, 44 Misc. 2d 878, 254 N.Y.S.2d 948 (Sup. Ct. 1964)
(indicating that non-compliance does not give buyer absolute right to rescind); Household
Discount Corp. v. Gleasman, 42 Misc. 2d 344, 247 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (failure
to acknowledge work completed by payee, prior to assignment, did not render note non-
negotiable, by virtue of N.Y. Retail Instalment Sales Act § 403(2)).
97. See Ben Constr. Corp. v. Snushall, 44 Misc. 2d 878, 254 N.Y.S.2d 948 (Sup. Ct.
1964).
98. "The only philosophy common to all legislation in this area is that conspicuous
disclosure will enable the consumer to protect himself or at least make a free choice. These
are both wan hopes; the solution is entirely inadequate. For it is apparent that most
consumers do not read the contracts they sign, twelve point type notwithstanding."
Shuchman, op. cit. supra note 86, at 309. Cf. 45 Ops. Att'y Gen. Cal. 8, 11 (1965). This
disclosure to the buyer was one purpose of the new law; see Memorandum of Dep't of
Law, in 1965 N.Y. Legislative Ann. 72, 1965 N.Y. Sess. Laws, at 2087 (McKinney's).
99. The failure to give the buyer a fully executed copy of the contract, as required by
§ 405 of the Retail Instalment Sales Act (and which copy would now include the referral
provision) may defeat the seller or his assignee; see Titone v. General Electric Credit Corp.,
201 Misc. 1041, 108 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
100. See supra, note 85; the buyer who reads may be in a slightly better position to
accept or reject the particular contract. But 'if the consumer can't purchase for cash, he
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may be unable to detect the difference. The difference may prove fatal,
because he may sign a very unfavorable contract, yet still be presumed to read
what he signs and to understand what he reads.
A final and perhaps most basic problem not reached by the amendment to
section 402 (2) is the inherent fallacy of all referral contracts-the "chain letter
effect." Any given single buyer may get the benefit of his agreement, if none of
the foregoing defects arise.' 0 1 And if the referral payment could be earned
simply by providing a name at random, regardless of the potential customer's
financial condition or his ownership of the item or need for the service in ques-
tion, all buyers could satisfy their obligation; the telephone directory would
assure that. But the seller could ill afford such an arrangement. The seller
will therefore restrict the buyers in providing names: to earn a payment the
buyer must provide the name of a person who actually buys the product or
service, or at least one who could afford it, who is presently without it, and who
has not been referred. The seller must thus insure himself a chance to convert
names into sales to stay in business. 10 2
This restriction means that no matter how large the financial resources or
how pure the methods of the seller, the success of the buyers as a group depends
on an inexhaustible supply 0 of bona fide potential customers. Whatever the
number of referrals required of each buyer to avail himself of the full benefits,
there cannot be enough remaining potential customers to prolong the chain
indefinitely.:04 The early and rapid success of the plan (should such occur) only
hastens its end, as far as the buyers are concerned. The last buyers in any
given market, whether because of the seller's failure or the exhaustion of
potential customers, must pay for whatever benefit their predecessors received,
without themselves benefiting at all.' 05 This feature is built into most of the
plans-thus if the seller can hold on long enough to exhaust the market, he
can either not purchase at all or do so on the only terms which the financial institution
will permit." Shuchman, op. cit. supra note 85, at 310. See also Are Changes Coming in Those
One-Sided Credit Laws?, 31 Consumer Reports 108 (1966): "The harsh truth is this ...
tall buyers] leave their consumer sovereignty at the door when they buy on credit. There
are only two choices-take the contract or leave it." Id. at 110.
101. That is, if the plan is operated by a completely honest seller, who has adequate
capital, etc.
102. The seller takes every possible step to turn this chance into a sure thing; see
Matter of People v. Compact Associates, Inc., 22 A.D.2d 129, 254 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1st Dep't
1964).
103. For example, if each buyer must submit 25 names, and each of these "referrals"
becomes a buyer under 'a similar agreement, the fourth round of referrals would involve
390,625 persons; the fifth round 9,765,625; and the sixth round, 244,140,625.
104. Those who remain unconvinced will be interested to learn that the completion of
the seventh round of referrals in the above example would require 6.1 trillion persons.
See Norman v. World Wide Distrib., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963); "The
plaintiffs introduced evidence to show that at the end of 20 months of operation, it would
require 17 trillion salesmen to carry on a referral program like World Wide described to
the plaintiffs." Id. at 57, 195 A.2d at 117 (emphasis in original).
105. These persons would by definition be able to earn no payments-there is simply
no one left to refer. They would pay the full contract price, which would be a total, in the
above example, of twenty-five times the amount paid to those who referred them.
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will ultimately make enormous profits from the last round of buyers. And the
buyer who is unaware of the history, in his area, of the particular plan offered
him is at a considerable disadvantage.
III. SOLUTIONS: JUDICIAL
The courts have not been entirely insensitive to the problems of the
buyer under instalment sales contracts, including referral types. They have
developed several doctrines or approaches to permit the buyer to avoid all or part
of his obligation, 00 when sued by the seller's assignee, without restraining
other uses of the same type of contract in other circumstances, or interfering
with the mythical freedom of contract 10 7 enjoyed by the instalment buyer.
These judicial remedies are at best partial answers, and of narrow application, 08
because they are in conflict with the bulk of the commercial law.
The most common form of judicial relief is a finding that the financing
agency is not entitled to the protected status of a "holder in due course" of a
negotiable instrument, 0 9 or an assignee for value of a contract.110 Such a finding
is made where the connection between the seller and the agency is so intimate
that the agency is deemed to know the real nature of the seller's agreements,
even without other notice.:"' Thus the agency has prior notice of the potential
claims or defenses of the buyer, and cannot claim to have accepted the buyer's
obligation in the belief that it was unqualified.1 2 This particular solution con-
flicts with the commercial need for freely negotiable or assignable paper, or it
could if it were too vigorously or too widely applied. 1 3
106. See Sutherland, Article 3-Logic, Experience and Negotiable Paper, 1952 Wis. L.
Rev. 230, 236-40.
107. See Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50
Va. L. Rev. 1178, 1179-83 (1964).
108. Id. at 1180: "'Back-door' or 'semi-covert' judicial techniques of misinterpretation
and misconstruction still abound as the principal sources of protection for adhering parties
[the buyers]. Legislatures still respond slowly, if at all, to consumer interests and their
response is too rigid to deal adequately with the speed and ingenuity of commercial
draftsmen."
109. See notes 51-54 supra; see also Comment, Finance Companies and Banks as
Holders in Due Course of Consumer Installment Credit Paper, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 389 (1960);
Note, Finance Company as Holder in Due Course, 51 Ky. L.. 134 (1962); Comment, Retail
Instalment Sales Financing-Rights of the Assignee-Endorsee, 40 Can. Bar Rev. 461 (1962).
Some representative cases where the agency was denied the status include: Palmer v.
Associated Discount Corp., 124 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Schuck v. Murdock Acceptance
Corp., 220 Ark. 56, 247 S.W.2d 260 (1952); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County
Mach. Wks., 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950); Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d
649 (Fla. 1953); Matthews v. Aluminum Acceptance Corp., 1 Mich. App. 570, 137 N.W.2d
280 (1965); Taylor v. Atlas Security Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W.2d 746 (1923); Local
Acceptance Co. v. Kinkade, 361 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. 1962); Budget Charge Accounts, Inc. v.
Petrowski, 155 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Wilson Bros. Sand & Gravel v. Cheyenne
Nat'l Bank, 389 P.2d 681 (Wyo. 1964); see also Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 8 (1955). Contra,
Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank v. Stepp, 126 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Fla. 1954).
110. See note 54, supra.
111. Such other notice may come to the agency indirectly; see N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 3-304(4)
(b), 1-201(25),(27); see also Comment, Retail Instalment Sales Financing-Rights of
Assignee-E.ndorsee, 40 Can. Bar Rev. 461 (1962).
112. See note 54, supra.
113. See note 59, supra. Cf. Warren, Mexican Retail Instalment Sales Law: A Com-
parative Study, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 15 (1962).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
An application of this judicial response has been styled the "active partici-
pation doctrine." 114 According to this view, the financing agency loses any
preferred status if it has participated in the sale to the extent of providing forms,
rate charts, and instructions for their use."15 This application may also be
unduly harsh, because it may tend to force sellers and their financers to avoid
establishing legitimate agreements with regard to the terms of the paper they
will write or accept. The solution has thus far been applied to situations where
the agency can be said to be the principal and the seller merely an agent,
usually in the financing of automobiles 16 and other large items.
Another doctrine sometimes employed to defeat the financing agency's suit
on a harsh contract is the "single instrument doctrine." 1 7 This doctrine is
invoked where the agency has accepted both parts of the original agreement,
even though they were originally separate, or were separated after execution.11
The theory behind this doctrine is that the agency acquires the buyer's obliga-
tion and the notice of the buyer's corresponding rights simultaneously. This
doctrine is unnecessary where separate instruments are prohibited, and has
served as a warning to financing agencies where they are still used.11
A more modern approach to prevent exploitation of the buyer is provided
by the Uniform Commercial Code. The most flagrant abuses may be held to
fall under the prohibition of unconscionable clauses of section 2-302.120 This
114. See Comment, Finance Companies and Banks as Holders in Due Course oJ
Consumer Installment Credit Paper, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 389 (1960). See also Jones, Finance
Companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer Paper, 1958 Wash. U.L.Q. 177, 179.
115. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260
(1940) (holder actually prepared contract, took contract under prior general assignment;
held party from beginning and not entitled to status of holder in due course without notice) ;
Commercial Investment Trust Corp. v. Emmons, 197 So. 662 (La. Ct. App. 1940) (holder
furnished all forms, instructions for their use, and rate charts for finance charges; held in
dispute over proceeds of fire insurance policy, premiums for which were charged to buyer,
holder estopped to deny he knew buyer paid for policy); see also Jones, op. cit. supra
note 109. The buyer may face procedural obstacles in presenting evidence of defects in
negotiable paper; see Brotherton v. New York State Supply Co., 48 Misc. 2d 463, 264
N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1965); National City Bank v. LaPorte, 109 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup.
Ct. 1951).
116. See Associated Discount Co. v. Goetzinger, 245 Iowa 326, 62 N.W.2d 191 (1954)
(where auto dealer agreed to procure loans by finance company to buyers, for which dealer
was paid by finance company, held he was agent of company) ; International Finance Corp.
v. Rieger, - Minn. -, 137 N.W.2d 172 (1965) (where finance company demanded satisfac-
tion certificate, seller forged same, held seller agent of finance company at least for purpose,
knowledge of forgery imputed to company so as to deny status of holder in due course);
Hughes, Agency in Hire-Purchase Transactions, 27 Mod. L. Rev. 395 (1964).
117. See, e.g., Federal Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Zelkor Dining Car Corp., 238 App. Div.
379, 264 N.Y. Supp. 723 (1st Dep't 1933) ; Commercial Investment Trust Corp. v. Joffe, 157
Misc. 225, 283 N.Y. Supp. 881 (Sup. Ct. 1935); James Talcott, Inc. v. Finley, 389 P.2d 988
(Okla. 1964) ; see also Md. Code Ann. art. 83, §§ 128-53 [Retail Sales Act], esp. § 147.
118. Contra, Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Wks., 34 Cal. 2d 766,
214 P.2d 819 (1950) (dictum).
119. Since the doctrine is invoked bnly when both parts of the original obligation meet
in the hands of the holder, the obvious solution for the holder is to take only the note. The
burden of proving that the two parts were originally one instrument is on the buyer
(maker), if the note does not refer to the contract; Universal C.I.T. Corp. v. Ingel, 347
Mass. 118, 196 N.E.2d 847 (1964).
120. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
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solution too is of limited utility: the presumption that the clause is "bargained-
for" may be impossible to overcome; 121 the clause may not have been overly
harsh at the time of the execution; 122 or the buyer may not have been surprised
when the seller later relies on the clause. 123 This approach might provide relief
for the buyer in one of the predicaments suggested above-if the seller fails
to include the referral agreement in the contract, thus making it appear that
the buyer had agreed to pay an enormously inflated price for the item purchased,
it might be argued that the buyer was sufficiently "surprised and oppressed" to
refuse enforcement. 124 The courts could probably reach the same result without
reference to the Code, by employing and perhaps broadening the common law
doctrine of fraud. It is not inconceivable that holding some of the more out-
rageous contracts prima facie fraudulent would be upheld.
All of these judicial remedies, whatever their particular shortcomings,
suffer from the same inherent weaknesses. Since they are only judicial attempts
to vary the apparent meaning or legal effect of a contract, they are confined
a to factual distinctions. If the lower courts push them too far, the appellate courts
may be compelled to reverse the decisions (to avoid undue restraint on com-
mercial contracts), thus resulting in no relief for the buyer involved, and
establishing a more authoritative precedent in favor of the seller against future
buyers. 25 There is some danger of introducing confusion into relations between
merchants if a rule of interpretation is announced which might seem to cover
all usages of particular contractual language. 1 26 And further, if the remedy does
(buyer signed contract creating security interest in seller in all goods previously purchased
from seller, until last payment on new item was made) ; see also Schneider, Unconscionable
Contract Unenforceable, 20 Personal Fin. L.Q. Rpt. 32 (1965) (discussion of the Williams
case).
121. The definition of an unconscionable clause is one which results in "oppression
and unfair surprise." See, e.g., Hume v. United States 132 U.S. 406 (1889) ; Campbell Soup
Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948); Quality Finance Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 148
N.E.2d 385 (1958). For a specific reference to excessive disparity between price and value
as an element of unconscionability, see Miami Tribe of Ohio v. United States, 281 F.2d 202,
150 Ct. Claims 725 (1960).
If the buyer is unable to rebut the presumption of reading and accepting the contract
including the clause, he cannot be said to have been unfairly surprised. Cf. N.Y. U.C.C.
§ 2-302 (Comment 1).
122. The rule only operates on what was or could have been known at the time of
the execution of the contract; hindsight will not render a fair provision unconscionable.
123. The seller deserves some protection against buyers who change their minds and
plead hardship; see note 121, supra.
124. This may be a perversion of the "unconscionability doctrine" which is usually
confined to provisions in the contract, but absent legislative relief, the courts should use
every statute to its reasonable limits in behalf of defrauded buyers; see Zenith Finance
Corp. v. jolly Gene Distrib., Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 821, 249 N.Y.S.2d 30 (Sup. Ct. 1964)(remedial statutes should be broadly construed) (dictum). The seller who has thus violated
the law deserves little sympathy; the financing agency should be protected only if it can
show clearly that itinvestigated carefully before accepting the obligation.
125. See Shuciman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 Temp. L.Q. 125, 138
(1962).
126. Cf. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-102, recognizing that different legal principles and restrictions
may be necessary when dealing with "consumers, farmers or other specified classes of buyers."
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work in any particular case, the seller's already incomprehensible (to the
buyer) form contract will soon be changed to accommodate the ruling.127
Thus the ultimate cure of these problems will probably rest with the
legislative and executive branches of government 128 especially if the plight of
the buyers who can't afford adequate counsel is to be corrected. The question of
whether statutory action is needed, and if so what form that action should:
take, must be answered by the legislature, in light of the foregoing problems and
others.' 29 The executive branch will undoubtedly enforce an effective statute
with vigor.
IV. SOLUTIONS: LEGISLATIVE AND ExxCUTIVE
The legislative and executive response to the problem of referral contracts
shows a wide variance. On the one extreme, many states impose no regulation
on them, except as some terms of the contract are controlled to a slight extent
by their retail instalment sales laws.130 In the middle ground are New York and
California, having requirements that the referral provisions be included in the
contract, and that it state that the balance is reducible by payments due the
buyer. 13
At the other extreme are the states of Massachusetts, Ohio and Missouri,
at least with respect to the official views of their respective Attorneys General.
All three officials have construed the lottery laws 32 to encompass some or all
127. See Shuchman, op. cit. supra note 125, at 138.
128. See Defense Dep't Directive No. 334.7, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,673-79 (1965) establishing
new controls over sellers who do business with military personnel.
129. Most of the more common abuses have been mentioned in the text; see Matter
of People v. Compact Associates, Inc., 22 A.D.2d 129, 254 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1st Dep't 1964);
Lundstrom v. R.C.A., 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P.2d 339 (1965). For some of the abuses not
suggested above, see, e.g., Whitby v. Associates Discount Corp., 59 Ill. App. 2d 337, 207
N.E.2d 482 (1965) (sellers changed date of first payment without notifying buyer, re-
possessed car when payment not made); Sturman v. Polito, 161 Misc. 536, 291 N.Y. Supp.
621 (Rochester City Ct. 1936) (illegal recaption clause); Barger v. Webb, 391 S.W.2d 664
(Tenn. 1965) (seller wrongfully repossessed).
130. Such controls as credit service charge limitations, delinquency charge llmits,
repossession and resale requirements, etc. are a common feature of such laws. See Rogers,
State Instalment Sales Laws, 26 Time Sales Financing 9 (1962). The effectiveness of the
laws in protecting the buyer has been widely questioned; see, e.g., Are Changes Consing in
One-Sided Credit Laws?, 31 Consumer Reports 108, 109 (1966): "Although sometimes
enacted in the name of consumer protection, these [state instalment credit] laws generally
condone grossly unfair collection tactics. Under many laws, for example, an instalment-sale
contract may empower the seller to repossess items bought on credit whenever he deems
the debt insecure" (emphasis in original).
1131. N.Y. Retail Instalment Sales Act § 402(2) (Supp. 1965); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1803.2
[covering consumer goods generally], 2982 [Auto Sales Finance Act]. See 43 Ops. Att'y
Gen. Cal. 212 (1963) (opinion of Att'y Gen. Mosk that the latter section requires the
referral buyer obtain a license on the ground that the buyer is selling autos by participating.
The opposite view was taken by an Ohio court; see First Discount Corp. v. Cua, 117 Ohio
App. 105, 190 N.E.2d 695 (Ct. App. Monroe County 1962)).
132. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 271, § 6A (1956) is the most specific; though lengthy,
it deserves quotation in full:
Endless chain transactions subject to laws relative to lotteries.
Whoever sets up or promotes a plan by which goods or anything of value is sold
to a person for a consideration and upon further consideration that the purchaser
agrees to secure one or more persons to participate in the plan by respectively
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types of referral sales plans, thus rendering the sellers under such plans liable
to criminal penalties,133 and subject to permanent injunction against such
devices.134 If these opinions are adopted by the courts, 35 this should put an
end to the use of referrals in those states. The sanctions against the seller
should be enough restraint; if they are not, the indirect pressure on the financing
agency should complete the task.' 3 6 The buyer's obligation, issued in furtherance
of an illegal scheme (under this view) would be unenforcible by the agency,
so such paper would be unacceptable.
Forcing the financing agency to carefully investigate the nature of the
contractual relation between buyer and seller to guard against instruments
making a similar purchase or purchases and in turn agreeing to secure one or more
persons likewise to join in the said plan, each purchaser being given the right to
secure money, credits, goods or something of value, depending upon the number
of persons joining in the plan, shall be held to have set up and promoted a lottery
and shall be punished as provided in section 7 [up to $2000 fine or year in prison].
The supreme judicial court shall have jurisdiction in equity upon a petition filed
by the attorney general to enjoin the further prosecution of any such plan and to
appoint receivers to secure and distribute the assets received thereunder.
The opinion of Att'y Gen. Brooke of Massachusetts that this statute includes referral sales
plans is digested in 6 Dig. of Ops. Att'ys Gen. (1965).
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2915.12 (Baldwin 1964) is much less definite; it is a codifica-
tion of the common law definition of a lottery. The opinion of Att'y Gen. McElroy appears
in 1959 Ops. Att'y Gen. Ohio 649. But see note 135 infra.
Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 563.430, 563.440 (1956) is a very much like the Ohio statute. The
opinion of Att'y Gen. Eagleton (86 Ops. Att'y Gen. Mo. 1963) was addressed to a plan
whereby the seller chose six persons out of twenty names submitted by the buyer, for
participation in the plan; because the buyer had no control over the seller's choice, there
was sufficient "chance" involved to make the plan a lottery. Whether any other plan would
be similarly condemned is an open question. See Goodin, Two Versions on Referral Sales,
17 Personal Fin. L.Q. Rpt. 99 (1963). Cf. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 849.091 (1965); N.Y. Pen. Law
§ 1703; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-19-1 (1956). See also Simpson & Duesenberg, 8 Ency.
of N.Y. Law-Contracts § 2703: Business Promotion by Chance: "A good business man
very likely understands well the human nature, and knows that among its most normal
characteristics is the urge to get 'something for nothing.' Promotional schemes geared to
appeal to this urge are therefore common. They may also be illegal as falling within the
condemnation of the lottery laws." (p. 287) (emphasis added); Yew Kwang, Why Do
People Buy Lottery Tickets?, 123 J. Pol. Econ. 530 (1965) ; State v. Cox, 136 Mont. 307,
349 P.2d 104 (1960).
133. Penalties under the lottery laws are: Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 271, § 7-fine
up to $2000 or year in prison; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2915.12: $500 fine or six months in
jail for first offense, $500-1000 fine or one to three years in prison for subsequent offenses.
134. See Commonwealth ex rel. Pa. Sec Comm'n v. Consumers Research Consultants,
Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428 (1964), an unsuccessful attempt to argue that a referral
sales plan there involved was a "profit sharing or participation agreement" so as to be a
security requiring the seller to be licensed under Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, § 32(a) (1965);
Emery v. So-Soft of Ohio, Inc., 300 Ohio 2d 226, 199 N.E.2d 120 (same result under Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 1707.01 et seq.).
135. The Ohio Attorney General's opinion, supra note 132, seems to have been rejected
in First Discount Corp. v. Cua, 117 Ohio App. 105, 190 N.E.2d 695 (Ct. App. Monroe
County 1962), where it was held that permitting the buyer to earn a refund by his own
efforts did not evidence the "chance" necessary to constitute a lottery. See also A.A. Murphy,
Inc. v. Taylor, 383 P.2d 648 (Okla. 1963) holding that a similar plan was not a lottery
within the meaning of Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §§ 1066-68 (1961).
136. The recovery of the financing agency on the buyer's contract would be denied, if
the seller's plan was held to be a lottery. The agency therefore would have to be
reasonably sure it did not accept such contracts, or would have to subject them to such a
high discount rate as to make the seller's profit very small.
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issued in pursuance of a lottery would entail more work on the part of the
agency. But this added burden should not prove intolerable. The increased
cost can be recovered by the agency through a higher discount rate on suspected
consumer paper.13 7 If referrals are declared lotteries,138 the agencies may be
compelled to value paper from reputable sellers more highly than that from
the marginal, but profitable, type.
To adopt this view-that referrals are lotteries-implies that referral plans
are completely abusive and unjustifiable, without any redeeming graces. Despite
what has been said about their inequity and unfairness in practice, it must be
pointed out that the idea of a refund or discount for providing the seller with an
additional buyer or buyers is not without economic merit.13 9 For example, an
informal agreement between a seller and a cash buyer under which the buyer
is to receive a discount for finding another customer for the last of a particular
item the seller has in stock would hardly seem to fall under the shadow of the
abuses catalogued.1 40 Yet any blanket condemnation of referrals would seem
to prevent such a transaction.
The real abuse of the referral arrangement stems from three sources: (i)
the combination of an inflated price and the referral payments; (ii) the use of
the referral feature in an unbroken series of transactions, that is, where every
sale includes the referral agreement; and (iii) the lack of adequate capital in
the sales organization. Any remedy enacted by the legislature or sponsored by
the executive branch which eliminates one or more of these has some chance of
success; the abuses could be eliminated without denying the use of such
methods entirely. This is not to suggest that referrals must be saved, or that
total prohibition would not be the just answer to the abuse; it is only to
suggest that alternatives to outright condemnation do exist.' 41
There are in fact several measures pending at the present time before the
New York legislature which take a limited approach to the broad spectrum of
consumer problems, 142 of which referrals are a part. None is addressed directly
137. For an example of this "dealer's reserve," see Missouri Dep't Stores v. Personal
Fin. Co., 364 S.W.2d 47 (K.C. Mo. Ct. App. 1962).
138. See note 131 supra.
139. Nor is such an idea condemned by law; see Matter of People v. Compact Asso-
dates, Inc., 22 A.D.2d 129, 254 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1st Dep't 1964): "We agree with . . .
[the dissent] that there is nothing illegal or fraudulent in door-to-door sales, nor in in-
ducing sales by offering credits for leads to sales to others." Id. at 131, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 267
(dictum).
140. The seller lacks the leverage to compel the buyer to accept an inflated price,
since the cash buyer is more nearly equal in bargaining power. And the cash buyer is not
threatened with having to deal with a finance company.
141. See infra, p. 692; see also note 128 supra.
142. Cf. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69 [Motor Vehicle Instalment Sales Law), §602(1965):
Findings and declarations of policy
It is hereby determined and declared as a matter of legislative finding;
(a) That an exhaustive study . . . discloses nefarious, unscrupulous and improper
practices in the financing of the sale of motor vehicles . . . which are unjustifiably
detrimental to the consumer and inimical to the public welfare. Such practices
prevail not only among some sellers, but also among some sales finance companies
and some banks, which acquire contracts arising out of instalment sales of motor
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to referrals, but all involve aspects of the instalment sales law which catch
instalment buyers, referral and non-referral alike.
The first such measure143 would extend the time in which the buyer may
notify the holder-assignee of his contract of defenses or claims against the
seller, from the present ten days to thirty days. Since these defenses accrue or
are discovered over a period of time, this would mean that more buyers would
have discovered defenses before their opportunity to communicate them to the
agency ran out. This is however still too short a time to assist the referral
buyer to any great extent; his defense or claim for non-payment of his com-
mission seldom arises until at least a month1 44 after the notice from the agency
(usually contemporaneous with the sale and transfer of the contract). In
addition this bill would impose a greater restraint on all instalment sales
financing. The agency would be more insecure about all the paper it accepted,
both as to the time lag before defenses are cut off and the likelihood that the
buyer will assert defenses. Desirable as this last may seem, it will likely
cause the agencies to discount all consumer paper more heavily; this will be
passed on to the buyers in the form of higher time prices. 45
The second proposal'4 6 would repeal that part of section 403(3) (a) of
the Retail Instalment Sales Act which now permits the waiver of buyer's de-
fenses as against the seller's assignee. A prohibition of such waivers would have
much the same effect as the previous proposal: higher costs to the buyer,
since the agency-assignee would lose a certain number of suits it now wins.
The agency can pass this cost to the seller-assignor, and the seller to the buyer;
there it stays. A repeal of the entire provision (section 403(3) (a)) would not
necessarily end the use of these clauses; they are sanctioned by case law' 47
and by the UCC.148 But a repeal of the portion of section 403(3) (a) which
permits such waivers, as is here proposed, would eliminate their use. 49
vehicles and which frequently influence the credit policies of seller.
(b) ....
(c) That consumers, because of ... legal technicalities and because of their unequal
bargaining position, are at the mercy of unscrupulous persons and are being in-
tolerably exploited in the instalment purchase of motor vehicles. Such exploita-
tion is evident in the unfair provisions of the instalment sales contract, exorbitant
charges for credit, extortionate default, extension, collection, repossession and
other charges, unconscionable practices respecting execution of contracts, refinancing
of contracts, prepayments, refunds, insurance, repossession and redemption.
143. A.I. 3934, Print A4028, N.Y. Legis., 189th Sess., N.Y. Leg. Record and Index(Albany, The Leg. Index Co., March 5, 1966), p. 759.
144. The majority of referral plans seem to be conducted on a monthly basis. The
writer is familiar with one plan which permits referrals to be made at any time and in
any number.
145. See note 83, supra.
146. A.I. 3237, Print A3312, N.Y. Legis., 189th Sess., N.Y. Leg. Record and Index
(Albany, The Leg. Index Co., March 5, 1966), p. 697.
147. See note 45, supra, for a listing of such cases.
148. N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-206(1). Cf. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law, art. 9 [Motor Vehicle
Instalment Sales Act] § 302(9).
149. N.Y. Retail Instalment Sales Act § 403(3) reads in part: "No contract or obliga-
tion shall contain any provision by which: (a) the buyer agrees not to assert against an
assignee a claim or defense arising out of the sale, but it may contain such a provision as to
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The third measure' 50 now pending would prohibit instalment sales by
door-to-door salesmen, and require that the contract be sent to the buyer.
The buyer would have 72 hours during which to accept or affirmatively reject
the contract (or more properly, the offer). If the buyer did not accept within
that time, the offer would lapse by operation of law. The bill further provides
that the instalment door-to-door salesman could not accept money unless the
merchandise were delivered at the same time. How these provisions are supposed
to be reconciled in practice is unexplained: the second part would seem to
permit part performance of the contract without waiting for the seventy-two
hour "cooling-off" period. Since instalment sellers quite often deliver the
merchandise on the first visit, this proposal would permit the buyer to pay
part of the money, receive the goods, and thus bind himself to the contract.
The absence of a written contract at this point does not give the buyer a great
deal of protection, because the seller can now argue that acceptance of the
goods binds the buyer to sign a contract; too few buyers would know that
this is not necessarily true.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Before turning to specific proposals to eliminate the referral abuses, it
would be helpful to restate the problem. In the words of one authority on
consumer problems the task is to "put an end to the opportunity for deceptive
practices which presently exist in so many areas where goods and services
are sold on time."' 5 ' By limiting attention to specific abuses, or abuses in a
single area of sales,' 52 the chances of preventing the unprincipled seller from
continuing his thievery, Ind yet leaving the honest seller unhindered are
increased. Another consideration that cannot be ignored is that such a limited
statute would be more likely to pass the legislature, where financial interests
are well represented, 53 than would a more sweeping or more general measure.
A remedial statute should also be predicated on the fact that the buyer
is the intended beneficiary. 54 If referral buyers are protected from existing
an assignee who acquires the contract ... in good faith and for value .... " If the exception
were repealed as proposed, there would seem to be no remaining possibility of the buyer's
being trapped as described above.
150. S.I. 3166, Print S3278, N.Y. Legis., 189th Sess., N.Y. Leg. Record and Index
(Albany, The Leg. Index Co., March 5, 1966), p. 295.
151. Mrs. Esther Peterson, Special Ass't to the President on Consumer Affairs, in Nat'l
Ass'n of Attorneys General, 1965 Conference Proceedings, at 41-48.
152. See Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 44 Cornell
L.Q. 38, 73 (1960).
153. See Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective
Programs for Protection, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 395 (1966).
.154. This may seem strange, but very often the consumer protection statutes have
had the undesirable effect of providing the sellers and financing agencies with more powerful
weapons than before; for example, loading the sales contract with detailed statutory pro-
visions may only further confuse the buyer. See Special Committee on Retail Instalment
Sales, Consumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury [Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Uniform State
Laws), Report of Annual Conference, Aug. 1955, pp. 9-14; Shay, The Proposed Uniform
Consumer Credit Law, 19 Personal Fin. L.Q. Rpt. 9 (1964); see also note 129, supra.
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abuses, the statute will have accomplished this. But there will be no lack of
incidental beneficiaries: the honest (or less rapacious) seller will benefit from
the return to the market of all the money now spent for nothing on referral
sales; 1 5 the many upright financing agencies would find more people are willing
to buy on time; 156 the legal community might even gain back the respect of the
"debtor class."'I5
With these ideas in mind, the following discussion of specific approaches
to curbing the referral seller may be more comprehensible. The proposals are
left in general terms; rather than attempting to draft a statute, the writer
desires only to call attention to methods of solving the problems raised in the
foregoing pages.
A statute which prohibited selling or offering for sale any consumer goods
or services at a price unreasonably' 58 higher than the usual or ordinary time
price ..for that product or service' 59 in the local market and simultaneously
promising payments to the buyer for referring prospective customers would
seem to answer most of the problems raised.160 It would cure the most frequent
abuses caused by the vanishing seller, inasmuch as the contract would only
require the buyer to pay approximately the market price' 6 ' for the item. Start-
ing with this price, the buyer could reduce his obligation. If the seller goes
out of business, the buyer would not be compelled to pay a premium price.
The worst fate the buyer could suffer would be to buy an item he would
otherwise have foregone, or to buy that item at a time he would not ordinarily
155. See 1963 Report of New York State Dep't of Law 12: "This relatively small but
active minority of unscrupulous operators does incalculable economic harm to the honest
business and service man. They drive upwards the cost of living, add inflationary pressures
and undermine the public faith and confidence whicl is essential to the well-being of the
American economy" (Ass't Att'y Gen. Levy).
156. See 23 Legal Aid Brief Case 245 (1965), remarks of Rev. Robert McEwen,
Chmn., Mass. Consumer Council: "What about those grey areas in civil law where the
unscrupulous seller of credit or merchandise operates? . . .To the average man who has
been mistreated in the market place, this type of operation is stealing pure and simple, even
though the law may say it is only a civil dispute."
157. Guilt by association though this may largely be, it is nonetheless a powerful
force in shaping the attitudes of the instalment buyers toward lawyers, courts and law
itself. See the remarks of U.S. Att'y. Gen. Katzenbach, quoted by Mrs. Peterson, in Natl
Ass'n of Attorneys General, 1965 Conference Proceedings, at 42.
158. That is, an economically unjustifiable increase in price. Cf. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73,
§§ 211 5 (1960) [Unfair Sales Act], and Hawkland, The Pennsylvania Unfair Sales and
Unfair Cigarette Sales Law, id. at 1 (introductory commentary). The writer suggests
that the approach to the problem concerned there-sales below cost to exploit competitors
-is not inapplicable to the present problem-sales above a reasonable price to exploit
consumers. See also R.I. Code §§ 6-13-1 et seq. (Unfair Sales Practices Act] (held un-
constitutional in part in Avella v. Almac's, Inc. - R.I. -, 211 A.2d 665 (1965)). Cf. Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 531-39 (1934).
159. A problem would arise if the product were not usually offered for sale at any
other price, or if the product or service were truly unique. In the former case, the usual
market price of similar goods could be used to find a reasonable price; in the latter the
court would be left to its own devices, as it so often is at present.
160. Under the assumption that credit service charges and other fees are proportionate
to the duration of the contract, either by express statutory sanction or by economic pressures.
See also note 83, supra and accompanying text.
161. The market or usual time sales price.
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have chosen. This is not an unreasonable economic cost to pay for his gamble;
it might result in some economic dislocation, 6 2 but at least he would have
gotten his "money's worth.
If it be objected that this statute would effectively ban referral sales, the
prospect is hardly alarming. The statute would do so only because the seller
needs the extra margin of the exorbitant price. This would be proof enough that
the referral was of no benefit to the buyer, and that it was as unworkable in
practice as it is in theory. If the referral plan cannot operate without the
artificially high price, this is proof enough that it must be exploitative to
survive. The marketplace will be better for its having departed.
Whatever its economic effect, the statute would have other legal advan-
tages over the present situation. If it were a criminal statute,104 as it almost
certainly would be, enforcement would no longer await an informed and
aroused buyer. The law enforcement agencies would be responsible for enforc-
ing the statute,165 using whatever means are provided therein to secure com-
pliance. Many of these agencies have used their present powers to their fullest
extent' 66 and would appreciate a more suitable weapon against the abuses.107
Perhaps the greatest advantage of the proposed law over the present
weapons would be its speed. Unlike the present situation where the Attorney
General must be able to show "a persistent course of fraud"6 6 before obtaining
162. The problem of the already heavily burdened buyer is not solved by this approach.
However, the long-standing inequality of the buyers and sellers should not be reversed; the
opposite situation of the present inequality is no more justifiable.
163. To the extent that any instalment buyer does.
164. The proposed statute could be included in some form in N.Y. Retail Instalment
Sales Act § 402(2), N.Y. Pen. Law § 1703 [by defining such inflated price-referral sales as
lotteries], or N.Y. Executive Law § 63(12) [making such sales specifically "fraudulent"].
165. See N.Y. Executive Law §663(12).
166. See Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective
Programs for Protection, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 395 (1966).
167. In the Compact case (frequently cited heretofore), the Department of Law had
to wait until over 10,000 sales had been made before making a sufficient case under N.Y.
Executive Law § 63(12) to enjoin further use of the referral sales plan involved; Matter of
People v. Compact Associates, Inc., 22 A.D.2d 129, 254 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1st Dep't 1964).
Even then the court was split 3-2 as to whether the proven incidence of fraud met the
statutory requirement of a "persistent course of fraud" or not; see dissenting opinion of
Justice Valente, id. at 134, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 270. In informal proceedings against another
seller on referrals, Ass't Att'y Gen. Tiffany of the Buffalo District office reports "Only
after some 800 sets had been sold in the two cities, on the referral basis in which the
purchaser agreed to pay approximately $1400 for sets which cost the seller $450 did com-
plaints start coming into the Buffalo and Rochester offices. [The Department] . .. obtained
assurances of discontinuance from both [sellers] and the payment of $1000 in each case as
costs. Both corporations are now out of business." 1964 Report of New York State Dep't
of Law 76. See also End of 30 Years' War on Consumers, 30 Consumer Reports 238 (1965).
168. N.Y. Executive Law § 63(12); this paragraph was amended by 1965 N.Y. Sess.
Laws ch. 666, to broaden the definition of fraud to include any device, scheme, artifice,
false pretense or unconscionable contract provision. One of the few real vindications of the
defrauded buyer in a suit for damages is the case of Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179
N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1962), where defendant seller's motion to strike buyer's
demand for punitive damages of $75,000 was denied. See also Comment, The Admonitory
Effect of Punitive Damages and Its Effect on the Law of Fraud and Deceit, 26 Albany L.
Rev. 288, 297-304 (1962); Note, 13 Syracuse L. Rev. 487 (1962); First Nat'l Bank v.
Anderson, 5 Bucks 287, 7 Pa. D & C.2d 661 (1956) (recitation of factors used in determining
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an injunction against further abuse, such a proceeding (if included) or a
criminal action could be started before a single fraudulent sale had been
made. In fact as outlined above no sale would be necessary at all, since offering
goods for sale on referral at an exorbitant price would be condemned.
Such a statute would also permit the use of referrals in the cash sale of
goods and services, assuming that the cash buyer will be in a bargaining position
such that the seller will be forced to keep the price competitive. There would thus
be no legal ban on either referrals or on selling for any price the seller desires-
but the combination of these two factors would be prohibited.
The buyer could also be directly protected against the disappearing or
insolvent seller by requiring the seller to post a bond guaranteeing performance
of its obligation to make the referral payments. The bond, equal to or greater
than the face value of all unpaid referral commissions under outstanding con-
tracts, posted with the Department of Law or the Superintendant of Banks,
would assure that the buyer would be able to collect money due him. And if
the buyer could proceed directly against the surety for payments he was
ready, willing and able to earn, and would have earned but for the failure of
the seller, the buyer would be able to take full advantage of the referral feature.
A bill' 0 9 introduced into the current session of the legislature would require
such a bond of all instalment sellers, but of a uniform amount of 50,000
dollars. This is an excellent start, but it will meet with strong opposition, and
if enacted will be so small as to aid only a few referral buyers; many of these
plans are multi-million dollar operations.
170
Another limited approach to the problem would be a restriction on the
number or percentage of the sales which could be made on such a plan by
the referral seller. For example, if the seller were prohibited from selling on
this plan to the persons referred by the original buyer, and forced to be
content with his ordinary instalment profit, the chain would be broken and
the later customers would not be competing with the original buyer for new
customers. Normal market forces would largely compel the seller to offer the
product to these later customers at a competitive price, since he cannot dangle
the lure of the referral payments in front of them.
This alternative is much less satisfactory than the types discussed above,
because it is addressed only to the "chain-letter" aspect of the problem and
does not assist the original buyer. The later buyers are kept out of trouble,
but the person referring them could still be victimized. In fact such a law
might make the original buyer's situation worse in some cases, simply because
the potential customers have less incentive to buy. If the original buyer must
fraud in the inception); Imperial Consumer Service, Inc. v. Walton, 78 Montg. Co. L.R.
37 (Pa. 1962) ; J. Christ, The Law of Contracts and Sales 97-104 (1938).
169. S.I. 2283, Print S2352, N.Y. Legis., 189th Sess. N.Y. Leg. Record and Index
(Albany, The Leg. Index Co., March 5, 1966), p. 213.
170. See note 167 supra; the 10,000 sales were made at an indicated price of $300. Any
estimate of how much of this was outstanding at any one time would be guesswork: the
three million dollar figure does at least suggest the insufficiency of the proposed bond.
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secure a sale to earn his payment, the increased difficulty of convincing the
new prospects to buy operates against the buyer as much as against the seller.
And if no sale were required to earn a payment, but only the name, the seller
would have to pass along the cost of payments made where no' sale resulted; 17
this would or could further discourage later customers even more, and further
increase the chances of the seller's bankruptcy.
A variation of this approach offers more protection to the buyer. If the
part of the buyer's debt which was subject to refund were limited, the buyer
would be able to take full advantage of the referral payments without either
bankrupting the seller or being exposed to greatly excessive payments. 172
Assuming for the moment that actual disclosure could be compelled, so that
the buyer fully understood the limits of the payments he was to receive, he
would not agree to such an extreme increase as is now common, if there were
no chance of his reducing it to a reasonable figure. The difference between the
indicated contract price and the price as reduced by the referral payments
would be offset, on the part of the seller, by the advertising benefits of the
referrals made.313
The last two approaches mentioned-limiting either the percentage of sales
made on a referral basis, or limiting the part of the buyer's debt reducible by
referrals-would of course work to their fullest extent only when coupled with
the first proposal made. Starting with a prohibition of unreasonable price in
the referral contract, and then limiting the number of these contracts (i.e.,
banning "referrals upon referrals") or the value of the referral feature would
seem to adequately solve the problem. Such a statutory scheme would cover
the abuses but would not apply to any other commercial practices.174 Such
general abuses as do exist can be dealt with in their own time.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Referral sales plans are presently exacting an exorbitant toll from con-
sumers nationwide. If any merit exists in such methods, abolition may be
171. To illustrate: Suppose the original buyer received the $400 TV set at no cost,
because the referral payments equalled his $1437 obligation. The seller has incurred the
wholesale cost of the set, plus his operating overhead at no gain. This cost (some $600-700)
will have to be passed along to the persons referred by the original buyer or the seller's
profit on the entire transaction would be reduced below the profit he would have realized
had he sold all of these sets on an ordinary instalment contract. Thus it would be dis-
advantageous for the seller to use the referral feature, but the buyers and not the seller
would make up for the disadvantage.
172. Using the argument above, if less than the total economic cost of the original
sale had to be distributed among the later customers, the increase would obviously be less
per sale and the customer more likely to buy. The seller is better off in either situation by
requiring a sale as a condition of earning a payment, because this guarantees the widest
possible spreading of the cost.
173. At least in theory, more sales result from the use of referrals.
174. ". . . Ulif each legislature focuses on the actual abuses within its jurisdiction in
the marketing of given items to particular buyers workable controls can be fashioned."
Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 44 Cornell L.Q. 38, 73 (1960).
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avoided by regulation; this much at least is necessary. Present legal controls
are inadequate to restrain the legal thievery under the plans: the legal frame-
work of commerce operates to the advantage of the seller and his financing
source, but not to the benefit of the victim.
Attempts are being made to correct the abuses of referral sales in New
York, but such attempts are not presently effective in preventing abuse. And
some of the measures being entertained may help instalment buyers generally,
but they do not purport to be tailored to the abusive referral seller. The prob-
lems of the referral buyer can be solved only by a statute specifically aimed at
the referral sales scheme, or by sophisticated judicial legislation. The choices
are altering or abolishing referral sales, not doing something or doing nothing.
DOUGLAS C. DODGE
